Abstract. Much attention has been paid to the design of languages for the speci cation of cryptographic protocols. However, the ability t o specify their desired behavior correctly is also important; indeed many perceived protocol aws arise out of a misunderstanding of the protocol's requirements. In this talk we give a brief survey of the history of requirements speci cation in formal analysis of cryptographic protocols. We outline the main approaches and describe some of the open issues.
Introduction
It has often been pointed out, that, although it is di cult to get cryptographic protocols right, what is really di cult is not the design of the protocol itself, but of the requirements. Many problems with security protocols arise, not because the protocol as designed did not satisfy its requirements, but because the requirements were not well understood in the rst place.
Not surprisingly, the realization of this fact has lead to a considerable amount of research in security requirements for cryptographic protocols. However, most of this literature is scattered, and unlike the topic of cryptographic protocol analysis in general, there is little existing survey work providing roadmaps to readers interested in learning more about the topic. In this paper we attempt to remedy this de ciency by providing a brief history and survey of the work that has been done in this area, and outlining what we consider to be some of the open problems.
Any s c heme for expressing requirements should satisfy three properties:
1. It should be expressive enough to specify properties of interest. 2. It should be unambiguous, and preferably compatible with with some system for formal analysis. 3. It should be easy to read and write.
The paper is organized as follows. We begin in the next section by describing some of the early approaches to specifying cryptographic protocol requirements, including that of Burrows, Abadi, and Needham. In the third section, we describe some of the main current approaches to requirements in terms of a spectrum from extensional to intensional requirements. In the fourth section and fth sections, we discuss two emerging areas of research: graphical languages for specifying cryptographc protocol requirements, and the expression of quantitative requirements. In the nal section, we sum up what we believe to be some of the open problems, and conclude the paper.
Early Work in Cryptographic Protocol Requirements
Most of the existing approaches to applying formal methods to cryptographic protocol analysis stem ultimately from that of Dolev and Yao 9 , who developed for the rst formalization of the intruder model that is commonly used today. However, since Dolev and Yao's work and its immediate successors was mainly focussed on theoretical results about the complexity of cryptographic protocol analysis, only one type of requirement w as considered, and that was the simplest: that some term or set of terms designated as secret should not be learned by the intruder. Some of the earlier work on automated cryptographic protocol analysis, such as the rst versions of the Interrogator 24 , also restricted itself to this limited de nition of secrecy. Others, such as the earlier versions of the NRL Protocol Analyzer 20 , allowed the user to specify security in terms of the unreachability of insecure states, in which i t w as possible to specify such a state in terms of words known by the intruder and the values of local state variables of the principles. However, the user was not given any further assistance in constructing requirments.
Probably the rst formal cryptographic protocol analysis system to provide a real mechanism for constructing formal requirments was the belief logic of Burrows, Abadi, and Needham 5 .
BAN logic does not address secrecy at all. Rather it con nes itself to questions of authentication. Questions that BAN logic can be used to decide have t o d o with beliefs the participating principals could derive about origin and use of information such as:
1. Where does the information come from? 2. What is the information intended for? 3. Is the information new, or is it a replay? 4. Who else has these beliefs about the information?
One uses BAN logic by attempting to see which of these beliefs can be derived from an idealization of the protocol. The BAN logic does not dictate which beliefs a protocol should be able to satisfy; rather it is up to the protocol analyst to decide what beliefs a protocol should guarantee, and to determine it those beliefs can be derived from the protocol. Thus, one might require that Alice believe that Kisagoodkey for communicating for Bob, and that Bob believe that K is a good key for communicating with Alice, but one might or might not want to require that Alice believe that Bob believes that K is a good key for communicating with Alice, and vice versa. Thus BAN logic provides what it probably the rst formal system for specifying cryptographic protocol requirements.
3 Safety Requirements for Cryptographic Protocols:
Secrecy and Correspondence
In the early to mid-90's the approach to cryptographic protocol veri cation tended towards the application of general-purpose tools such as model-checkers and theorem provers. With this came the need to develop means for specifying the properties one was attempting to prove. Since, in general, researchers were now reasoning directly about messages passed in a protocol, rather than about beliefs that were developed as a result of receiving those messages, it now made sense to develop requirements in terms of messages sent and received rather than beliefs derived.
As is the case for requirements in general, requirements for cryptographic protocols tend to fall into two categories, extensional and intensional. Extensional systems provide a small set of generic requirements that can be de ned independently of the details of any particular protocol. Intensional systems provide languages and techniques that can be used to specify requirements for speci c protocols in terms of the protocols themselves. This concept was rst discussed in detail in the context of cryptographic protocols by Roscoe in 27 . He noted that the earlier work in cryptographic protocol requirements, such as BAN, leaned to the extensional side, and he showed how one might specify intensional protocol requirements in CSP.
Requirements for cryptographic protocols also fall into two classes that are related to the properties that such protocols are intended to enforce: secrecy and correspondence. Secrecy requirements describe who should have access to data. Correspondence requirements describe dependencies between events that occur in a protocol, and are usually used to express authentication properties. These two t ypes of requirements later turned out to be more closely related than one might think both Syverson and Meadows 32 and Schneider 28 de ne secrecy requirements as a type of correspondence requirement, but for the moment w e shall treat them as separate.
Of course, not all requirements can be characterized in terms of secrecy and correspondence. In particular, they are both safety properties, so any non-safety requirements such as fairness and its relatives, which are relevant for many electronic commerce protocols will not fall into either of these two categories. However, secrecy and correspondence cover most requirements relevant to authentication and key exchange, and thus make a good starting point.
At rst, correspondence requirements appeared to be the most subtle and complex; thus the earlier work tended to concentrate on these. Moreover, the emphasis was on extensional requirements and the ability t o c haracterize a general notion of correspondence in a single de nition. Probably the rst work in this area was that of Bird et al 4 . In the introduction to their paper, they describe an error-free history of a protocol runs between two prinicpals A and B to be one in which all executions viewed by both parties match exactly one-to-one. This is idea is re ned by Di e, van Oorschot and Wiener in 8 to the idea of matching protocol runs, which says that at the time Alice completes a protocol the other party's record of the run matches Alice's. This notion was further re ned and formalized by Bellare and Rogaway i n 3 to the notion of matching conversations, which developed the idea in terms of a complexity-theoretic framework.
Such general of notions of correspondence can be very useful, but they do have a drawback. They can be used to determine whether or not information was distributed correctly, but they can not be used to determine whether or not all information that should have been authenticated was included in the run.
To see what we mean, we consider the attack found by Lowe 18 on the Station-to-Station protocol of 8 . The protocol is de ned as follows: The intruder forwards this message to A. Thus, at the end of A's run, A believes that it shares a key with B. B, h o wever, thinks that C is trying to establish a connection with it, and it will reject A's nal message when it receives it, because it is expecting con rmation from C, not A. O n t h e other hand, the protocol does satisfy the matching protocol runs de nition of security, since A's picture of the authenticated portions of the messages is the same as B's. Indeed, this is the protocol used to illustrate the concept by Di e, van Oorschot, and Wiener in 8 .
Lowe's attack, of course, does not mean the Station-to-Station protocol is insecure. Indeed, this very feature of that protocol is seen as a desirable property in the latest version of IKEv2, the proposed replacement to the Internet Key Exchange protocol 17 . All it does is show that, if the name of the intended recipient is not included in the responder's message, a de nition of security that is speci ed in terms of conditions on correspondence between messages will not catch lack of agreement on information that is never sent.
Lowe's solution to this problem in 18 was to strengthen the matching protocol runs requirement to include the condition that when A completes a protocol run with B, then not only should the two protocol runs match, but B should believe that he has been running the protocol with A. In a later paper, 19 , he developed this idea further, developing a hierarchy of authentication requirements which g a ve conditions of varying degrees of strictness on the conclusions a principal A could draw about B's view of the protocol after completing the protocol with B. These were then formalized using the process algebra CSP.
The least restrictive requirement Lowe g a ve w as liveness, which simply requires that, when A completes a run of the protocol, apparently with B, then B has also been running the protocol. Moving further up the hierarchy, w e require A and B to agree on messages sent a s w ell as identities this requirement correspondes roughly to matching protocol runs, to agree on the roles they are playing, to agree on the values of speci c data items, and so forth. We see now that we are moving away from extensional requirements that can be speci ed independently of the protocol, and more to intensional requirements. If principals need to agree on speci c data items, we need to specify what these data items are, and where they occur in the protocol. The next step would be to specify the conditions on events that occur in protocols. Indeed, it should be possible to specify the types of requirements we are interested in using the temporal logics that are generally used to provide correctness speci cations for model checkers.
This is the sort of reasoning that lay behind Syverson and Meadows' development of a requirements language for the NRL Protocol Analyzer 32 , which eventually became known as the NRL Protocol Analyzer Temporal Requirements Language NPATRL. The idea is to develop a simple temporal language that can be used to specify the type of requirements that are commonly used in authentication and key distribution protocols. The atomic components of the language correspond to events in the protocol e.g. the sending and receiving of messages, or the intruder's learning a term. Besides the usual logical connectives, it contains only one temporal operator, 3 -, or happened previously."
The use of this single logical operator re ects the fact that most correspondence requirements can be expressed in terms of events that must have o r m ust have not occurred before some other events.
Although NPATRL is a very simple language, we have found it useful for specifying some widely varying types of cryptographic protocols. These include key distribution and key agreement protocols 30, 31 , complex electronic commerce protocols such as SET 22 , and, most recently, group key distribution protocols 23 .
One interesting result of our experience is that we h a ve found NPATRL increasingly useful for specifying complex secrecy requirements as well as complex authentication requirements. Early requirements for secrecy simply designated some information, such as keys, as secret, and all that needed to be guaranteed was that these keys would not be available to an intruder. However, more recently, requirements such as perfect forward secrecy put other conditions on an intruder learning a term. Perfect forward secrecy requires that, if a master key is compromised, then an intruder can only learn a session key after the compromise, not before. Such a requirement is straightfoward to specify using a temporal language.
Of course, temporal logics are not necessary in order to specify these types of requirements. Other formalisms will work as well. For example, Schneider 28 de nes authentication in terms of the messages that must precede a given message, and secrecy in terms of another correspondence requirement, that the intruder should not learn data unless that data was explicitly sent to the intruder. Both of these are formalized in CSP.
Another approach to requirements, taken by F ocardi et al. 12 , allows one to specify requirements of varying degree of generality. They make use of notions derived from noninterference. Their notion of correctness, Generalized Nondeducibility on Composition, or GNDC, is de ned as follows.
We let P be a process representing a cryptographic protocol operating in the absence of an intruder. Let P jjX denote the composition of P with an intruder X. Let denote a function from processes to processes where P is a process describing the correct" behavior of P. Let denote a preorder. Let C denote the set of channels between honest principals, and let Q C denote the restriction of a process Q to C. Then a process satis es GNDC , if, for all intruders X P jjXnC P In the case of that is the identity function and is trace equivalence, the property becomes N D C , or Nondeducibility on Composition, which requires that the traces produced by the process in composition with an intruder be the same as the traces produced by the process in the absence of the intruder. This can be thought of as an information-ow property in which the intruder and P play the apart of High and Low, respectively, corresponding to the standard multilevel application of noninterference for multilevel security 14 . N D C , since it requires that a process behave in the presence of an intruder exactly at it would behave in the absence, is more stringent than any of the other requirements that have been discussed in this section. As a matter of fact, we can consider it the most stringent de nition possible, closely akin to the fail-stop de nition of protocol security of Gong and Syverson 13 . Moreover, GNDC provides a framework that allows one to specify less restrictive requirements such as the various forms of correspondence discussed earlier, and the types of requirements that would be de ned in a temporal language such a s N P ATRL. Thus GNDC can be thought of as providing a general framework for requirements, including requirements that go beyond the usual notions of correspondence, such a s l i v eness.
Another technique that deserves mention is the notion of using type theory to specify security requirements and evaluate the correctness of protocols 1, 15 . Here components making up a protocol, such as data, channels, etc. are assigned di erent types, such as secret or public. Rules are also developed for deriving types from the results of applying operations, such as encryption, on data. Security violations can be de ned in terms of typing violations, such a s a piece of data type public appearing on a channel of type public. Most of this work has been applied to the type-checking of secrecy properties, but Gordon and Je rey 15, 16 have developed ways of applying it to correspondence properties, speci cally one-to-one each e v ent of a certain type should be preceded by one and only one event o f a certain other type and one-to-many each e v ent of a certain type should be preceded by at least one event of a certain type. Since the types are supplied as part of the protocol speci cation, this application of type theory gives a nice way of incorporating a requirements speci cation as an annotation on the protocol.
Graphical Requirements Languages
Languages and frameworks such as NPATRL and GNDC allow us increasing exibility and expressiveness for specifying requirements. But, the ability to specify more complex and subtle requirements also has a cost; the requirements become more di cult to comprehend and write. In this section we discuss two graphical approaches to increasing the ease of handling such speci cations that make use of some of the common features of cryptographic protocols and their requirements.
The rst of these is known as Strand Space Pictures 10 . Strand spaces 11 a r e a w ell-known and popular model for cryptographic protocol analysis, in which the actions of principals are modeled in terms of graphs. A strand represents a principal executing a role in a protocol. The sending and receiving of messages is represented by positive and negative nodes. Nodes that represent one event immediately preceding another on a strand are connected by double arrows. A bundle is a collection of strands, in which positive send nodes can be connected to negative receive nodes via a single arrow if the message sent matches the message received. This model facilitates the graphical representation of protocols, and 10 actually describes a numberof ways in which the graphical features of strand spaces could be used, but the one of most interest to us is the way in which they can be used to represent requirements. Using strand space representation of protocols, it is possible to represent correspondence requirements in terms of relative placement of strands. Thus, if we w ant to specify a correspondence requirement which requires that if certain messages are accepted, then other messages were sent previously, w e can represent sending and receipt of the messages we are interested in by portions of strands, and we can use the placement of the strands so that earlier nodes appear above later ones to indicate which e v ents we w ant to occur before others.
The strand space pictures methodology, w as never, as far as we know, developed into a full-edged procedure with well-de ned ways for representing major classes of requirements. However, in 10 the authors give several examples which show h o w some standard requirements such as freshness or agreement properties could be represented in this framework.
It is also possible to use strand spaces to provide a very convenient w ay o f expressing a limited type of correspondence. Strands can be parameterized by the name of the principal executing the strand and the data it sends and receives. Thus, in the Station-to-Station protocol the initiator's strand would be parameterized by Init A; B; X; Y; K , while the responder's would be parameterized by Resp B; A; X; Y; K , where X and Y are the initiator's and responder's Di e-Hellman components, respectively, and K is the key derived from the Di e-Hellman exchange. Earlier, we described how Lowe showed that after A completed the Station-to-Station protocol, A and B would agree on B's identity and on the Di e-Hellman components and key, but not A's identity. We could express that fact as a requirement that, after an initiator A nishes executing the protocol, apparently with a responder B, if the initiator's strand is Init A; B; X; Y; K , then the responder's strand is Resp ; A ; X ; Y ; K , where * denotes a wild card. Unlike the strand space pictures, this notation cannot express conditions on the relative times of occurrence of events from two different strands. However, since many requirements have to do not so much with agreement on placement o f e v ents as with agreement on data such a s k eys, this notation has been useful for in a number of di erent cases. It would be interesting to see how far it could be extended and still retain its compactness and readability.
A somewhat di erent approach has been taken by Cervesato and Meadows 7 in the development of a graphical representation of the NPATRL language. This representation was based on the fact that queries in the NRL Protocol Analyzer, for which N P ATRL was designed, are couched in terms of events that should or should not precede some speci ed event. Such a w ay of formatting queries has an obvious connection to fault trees. A fault tree is a graphical means of representing failure modes in safety-critical systems. The root of the tree represents the failure with which the system designer is concerned, and the branches represent the conditions under which the fault can occur. The main di erence between NPA queries and fault trees is that in NPA queries the relationship is one of precedence, while in fault trees it is one of causality. Otherwise the structure is very similar. Moreover, the graphical representation makes it easier to understand the relationships between the various events. For this reason, we found it very helpful, in particular, to represent the GDOI requirements, especially the more complex ones, in terms of fault trees. In 7 a fault tree semantics for the subset of NPATRL requirements accepted by the NPA is developed, and some sample requirements are shown.
Quantitative and Probabilistic Requirements
So far, with few exceptions, the requirements we have looked at have dealt with safety requirements for discrete systems. This ts well when we want to analyze authentication and key distribution protocols that follow the Dolev-Yao model, where the cryptosystem is a black b o x, and principals communicate via a medium controlled by a hostile intruder who can read, alter, and intercept all tra c. But, since the correctness of a protocol depends on the correctness of the cryptoalgorithm that uses as well as the way it uses those algorithms, it would be useful to have correctness criteria that took the properties of the cryptoalgorithms into account.
Prior to and concurrent with the explosion of formal methods approaches to cryptographic protocol analysis, there has been a parallel e ort in developing correctness criteria for cryptoalgorithms and cryptographic protocols based on complexity-theoretic approaches. Indeed, the work of Bellare and Rogaway cited earlier was developed in such a context. What has been lacking however, has been a means of integrating such a complexity-theoretic approach with the logical systems that we h a ve been considering in this paper. However, some work in this area is beginning to appear, such as the work of Abadi and Rogaway 2 , which considers a complexity-theory based model as a semantics for a logical system, although it restricts itself to secrecy requirements, and the work of Mitchell et al 25 , which develops a notion of bisimulation that takes into account complexitytheoretic and probabilistic considerations.
The use of cryptography is not the only place where quantitative requirements become relevant. For example, many anonymity protocols, are intended to provide a statistical notion of security. An intruder may have a nontrivial chance of guessing the identity of a sender or receiver of tra c, but we d o n o t want that chance to exceed a certain threshold. Protocols intended to protect against denial of service attacks may need to limit the the amount of resources expended by a responder in the early steps of the protocol. Recently, researchers have begun to investigate ways of applying formal methods to the analysis of protocols that must satisfy quantitative requirements. Examples include the work of Meadows on a model for the analysis of protocols resistance to denial of service 21 where requirements are speci ed in terms of a comparison between resources expended by a responder versus resources expended by an initiator; the work of Butty an and Hubaux 6 on rational exchange protocols, in which a protocol is modeled as a game in which all principals are assigned payo s, and an exchange protocol is deemed rational if the strategies available to all participants form a Nash equilibrium; and the work of Shmatikov on anonymity protocols and contract signing, in which the protocols and their requirements are modeled in terms of Markov c hains 29, 26 , making them amenable to analysis by probabilistic model checkers.
Conclusion
We have given a brief survey of research i n expressing cryptographic protocol requirements. We believe that it this point w e h a ve a good handle on the speci cation of the standard secrecy and correspondence requirements of security protocols. It appears possible to derive techniques that are compatible with just about any t ype of formal system, and we h a ve a v ast range of requirement speci cation styles, from one end of the extensional-intensional spectrum to the other.
There are of course a number of areas in which w ork on cryptographic protocol requirements needs to be extended. One is in making the requirements language user-friendly. Security protocols, and thus their requirements, can be complex; even more so when one must consider operation in partial failure modes such as compromise of temporary session keys. Thus it makes sense to concentrate on ways of making requirements languages easier to use, even when the requirements are complex. In this paper we discussed some of the work on graphic requirements languages that attempts to address this problem.
Another area in which work is just starting is in extending cryptographic requirements speci cations beyond secrecy and correspondence. These would apply to protocols whose goals go beyond those of key distribution and authentication that have traditionally been handled in this area. One area of particular interest here is quantitative requirements. We have pointed out some areas in which the ability to understand a protocol's behavior from a quantitative point of view appears to be crucial. In this case, not only requirements need to be developed, but formal models for specifying the protocols that must satisfy the requirements. We h a ve described some of the work in this area as well.
There are some other areas which could also use more exploring. For example, many electronic commerce protocols must satisfy various types of non-safety requirements. Is it possible to develop ways of characterizing and specifying these requirements in ways that are particularly relevant to security protocols, as has been done for the safety properties of secrecy and correspondence? Another area of research has to do with interoperability. Increasingly, many protocols will rely upon other protocols to supply some of their security services. What is the best way t o specify services needed by one protocol in terms of requirements upon another? We hope to see research in these and other emerging areas in the near future.
